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Abstract This article evaluates the implementation of
Proposition O, a stormwater cleanup measure, in Los
Angeles, California. The measure was intended to create
new funding to help the city comply with the Total Max-
imum Daily Load requirements under the federal Clean
Water Act. Funding water quality objectives through a
bond measure was necessary because the city had insuffi-
cient revenues to deploy new projects in its budget. The
bond initiative required a supermajority vote (two-thirds of
the voters), hence the public had to be convinced that such
funding both was necessary and would be effective. The
bond act language included project solicitation from the
public, as well as multiple benefit objectives. Accordingly,
nonprofit organizations mobilized to present projects that
included creating new parks, using schoolyards for flood
control and groundwater recharge, and replacing parking
lots with permeable surfaces, among others. Yet few, if
any, of these projects were retained for funding, as the city
itself also had a list of priorities and higher technical
expertise in justifying them as delivering water quality
improvements. Our case study of the implementation of
Proposition O points to the potentially different priorities
for the renovation of urban infrastructure that are held
by nonprofit organizations and city agencies and the
importance of structuring public processes clearly so that
there are no misimpressions about funding and imple-
mentation responsibilities that can lead to disillusionment
with government, especially under conditions of fiscal
constraints.
Keywords Proposition O  Clean Water Act 
Total Maximum Daily Load  Stormwater management 
Water quality improvement  Fiscal constraints 
Participation
Introduction
With the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and other environmental protection laws in the
1970s, public participation was formally integrated into
rule making through public comment, and in their imple-
mentation by standing to sue if implementation was seen to
violate the law. Public comment and standing to sue
reflected a sea change that was occurring regarding the role
of the state and its responsibility to act in a transparent and
open manner that was more inclusive of the public. Per-
ceived state failures to adequately regulate the environment
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created the push for these new regulations, and increased
public participation was seen as improving the substantive
and procedural quality of decisions (Beierly and Konisky
2000, p. 567). These developments have led to a sense
that ‘‘public participation is … considered an unalloyed
good’’ (Rydin and Pennington 2000, p. 153). As a result,
the drive to increase access and influence by the public and
concerned nonprofit organizations in environmental poli-
cymaking has been a key component of many programs,
from watershed management initiatives to forest manage-
ment plans, including the funding of nonprofits to
implement environmental programs.
In this case study, we examine a one-half-billion-
dollar storm-water bond initiative passed in 2004 by the
voters of the City of Los Angeles that included solici-
tation of proposals for new infrastructure and projects
from the public and a multiple-benefits approach to
meeting the Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) for
pollution established by the federal Clean Water Act
(CWA), interpreted for local pollution conditions by the
state Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB).
The bond itself was written through a consultative pro-
cess that invited prominent environmental nonprofits
and leaders in the environmental movement to author
the proposition with city officials. The approach to the
initiative was clearly a participatory stakeholder pro-
cess, reflecting the perceived importance of including
representatives of the public. Those invited represented
interested and engaged stakeholders who had been adept
at using the public participation language of the CWA to
engage in local governmental processes. In fact, several
of the invited organizations had been party to a lawsuit
under the CWA to force the city to upgrade its storm-
water quality.
In this article we discuss the geographical and political
components involved in shaping environmental strategies,
management policies, and programs in response to
increasingly stringent water quality regulations in the city
of Los Angeles. Through this case study, we show how
tensions can arise when nonprofit organizations are invi-
ted to participate but government retains all the control, in
contradistinction to the approach described above. For
Los Angeles, like other jurisdictions in California, such
tensions are important to understand, as raising new
funding streams is difficult, requiring a two-thirds
majority (supermajority) vote by the electorate. When
nonprofit organizations feel excluded from decision
making and implementation, and there is a perception that
the process is not transparent—that is, that the city itself
has an unrevealed agenda it is pushing through by con-
trolling the process—the city jeopardizes its ability to
enlist their support for additional, needed funding in the
future.
Study Site: Los Angeles, a Complex Urban Setting
Size and Place
Los Angeles is a city of 4 million people, spanning
1215 km2 that includes steep mountains, coastal areas, and
hot inland valleys. The Mediterranean climate can produce
heavy seasonal rains and storm-water flow can amount to
38 billion liters a day into Santa Monica Bay in rainy-
weather days and 378 million liters a day in dry-weather
days (Los Angeles Bureau of Sanitation, www.lastorm-
water.org/Siteorg/residents/whatis.htm). The city is down-
stream of steep and high mountains in national forests (up
to 3 km), and upland cities. Storm water carries with it
nonpoint source pollution—urban detritus—that contami-
nates local waters and the ocean. Pollution includes
bacteria, fecal coliform, heavy metals, nitrogen, and other
pollutants (LADPW 2006). Treating this volume of storm
water and dry-weather runoff is a fiscal and infrastructure
construction near-impossibility, requiring different CWA
compliance strategies than might be pursued in places with
lower storm-water volumes and fewer surges. While there
is a recently adopted Integrated Regional Water Manage-
ment Plan (IRWMP) between the city and the county of
Los Angeles, implementation costs and process remain
problematic and there are no established mechanisms for
cost-sharing.
A Tax-Limited State
In addition to the sheer size of the watersheds in which Los
Angeles finds itself, and the natural climate conditions that
pose engineering challenges to storm-water treatment,
California is a tax-limited state. No new local taxes or bond
measures can be implemented without a two-thirds
majority vote. California is also one of three states that
require a two-thirds majority vote to pass the state budget.
This affects the funding for all programs at all levels—city,
county, and state (Pincetl 1999; Shrag 1999).
Similar to many cities in the United States, the city of
Los Angeles has been delinquent in its infrastructure repair.
The American Society of Civil Engineers estimates that
Los Angeles needs more than $30 billion simply to per-
form required maintenance on its infrastructure, let alone
meet new CWA requirements that necessitate new infra-
structure. This situation suggests that for the city to comply
with the requirements of the CWA, it needs a superma-
jority of voters to support additional taxes or fees.
What has been Done
There have now been various Best Management Practices
(BMPs) implemented in Los Angeles. The cities of Los
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Angeles and Santa Monica are in the process of installing
catch-basin inserts and covers to retain pollutants and
trash (Lau and others 2001). Catch basins have been
stenciled with the sign ‘‘No dumping—this drains to
ocean’’ to inform the public, and the city has installed
38,000 catch-basin inserts. Low-flow diversions have been
installed (Stenstrom 1999). The city and county of Los
Angeles are also collaborating on a joint demonstration
project in the Sun Valley area to manage storm-water
runoff and flooding using schoolyards as spreading
grounds among other BMPs, including afforestation
(Higgins and Roth 2005). The Sun Valley flagship mul-
tiple-benefits storm-water project is a result of the
charismatic leadership of the founder of one of the city’s
most prominent nonprofit organizations, TreePeople.
Andy Lipkis was able to forge the city and county part-
nerships necessary for this experimental alternative to a
conventional storm drain, and was one of the advocates
for including multiple-benefits projects in the language of
Proposition O.
In addition, the city and county of Los Angeles have
several diversion systems that pump dry-weather flow from
the storm drain into sanitary sewers and treatment plants.
Santa Monica has built the Santa Monica Urban Runoff
Recycling Facility (SMURRF) to treat dry weather runoff
(Shapiro 2002). Thus, the city and county of Los Angeles
and other cities in the county have been working to reduce
storm-water runoff, integrating various approaches from
structural BMPs and several land-use-based BMPs.
including the unique Sun Valley project.
Proposition O
Proposition O—the Clean Water, Ocean, River, Beach, and
Bay Storm-water Cleanup Measure—was approved over-
whelmingly, by 76% of Los Angeles voters, in 2004 and
authorized the city of Los Angeles to issue $500 million in
general bonds for storm-water projects to:
• Protect rivers, lakes, beaches, and the ocean
• Conserve and protect drinking water and other water
sources
• Reduce flooding and use neighborhood parks to
decrease polluted runoff and capture, clean up, and
reuse storm water.
The Administrative Structure
Proposition O is administered by:
• A Citizens Oversight Advisory Committee (COAC)
• An Administrative Oversight Committee (AOC)
• The Watershed Protection Division (WPD) of the
Bureau of Sanitation (BOS), located in the Department
of Public Works
The COAC, representing the public, is composed of
appointees. The mayor appoints four of the nine members,
and the city council president appoints the others. Three
must be experienced in clean water; one must be recom-
mended by the Regional Water Quality Control Board, and
others are to represent the public in general terms. The
COAC is responsible for:
• Establishing the criteria for selection of projects, in
collaboration with the Bureau of Sanitation
• Applying the criteria to projects
• Recommending projects for funding
• Establishing projects’ funding levels
The COAC recommendations then go to the AOC,
which represents the mayor’s office. The AOC consists of:
• The city’s Administrative Officer
• The Chief Legislative Analyst of the city
• A representative from the mayor’s office
• One of the mayor-appointed commissioners from the
Board of Public Works
• The General Manager of the Department of Water and
Power
The AOC makes its determination and sends its rec-
ommendations to the city council, which makes the final
determination about projects. When the COAC and the
AOC have dissenting opinions, the AOC can override the
COAC.
The WPD is the city agency responsible for managing
and administering Proposition O. It is also responsible for
compliance with the CWA. In addition, it is responsible for
developing implementing storm-water pollution abatement
projects throughout the city and for overseeing their con-
struction. It therefore has a strong vested interest in
Proposition O’s success in storm-water quality improve-
ment, as well as in the types of projects selected. WPD’s
current annual expenditures are $31 million, amounting to
about $1.91 per month per household—an amount that has
been frozen since 1991.
Public Participation
The implementation of Proposition O included assistance
to the public in writing proposals. This was provided by
three large engineering firms under long-term contract
with the Bureau of Sanitation, with the idea that the
proposals would then be competitive for funding with
those generated by governmental entities, including city
departments.
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Approximately $190,000 was spent for outreach and
consulting services in the first year. Over 100 people
attended workshops held at several locations throughout
Los Angeles. In December 2005, the city received 50
project proposals by city agencies and community organi-
zations. Among them, 22 projects were proposed by local
environmental nonprofit organizations.
The City Process
The Proposition O bond initiative listed goals to achieve
with no language to guide the implementation of the goals.
The Proposition did not prioritize among the listed goals,
there were no stated quantitative pollution-reduction tar-
gets, nor was there a framework for choosing projects.
Nearly all the water bodies in the city are polluted, some
are more polluted than others, and the watersheds of the
streams and rivers differ greatly, but the proposition did not
address any of these factors. Therefore, it fell to the COAC
to develop an implementation process. This largely con-
sisted in developing project-selection criteria. Although
certain members of the COAC argued for the development
of a plan for the implementation of the bond to ensure an
orderly and clear process and set of priorities, the majority
favored simply developing project selection criteria that
could be applied to each proposal individually. Even the
development of criteria, however, turned out to be a con-
tentious process, as the proposition stated multiple goals
and members of the COAC represented different interests
and communities.
Community representatives on the COAC felt strongly
that multiple benefits meant local open-space and greening-
community benefits, whereas water quality representatives
felt that criteria should prioritize water quality and that
criteria could not be well developed to evaluate multiple
benefits, as multiple benefits are diffuse. The result was a
nonrigorous, vague, and contradictory set of criteria. The
Project Review Committee (PRC), created in December
2005, then used the criteria to categorize each individual
proposal.
The PRC was staffed by five different city agencies,
including:
• The WPD (located in Public Works)
• The Bureau of Engineering (located in Public Works)
• The Department of Water and Power
• The Recreation and Parks Department
• The Environmental Affairs Department
COAC members and the public were invited to partic-
ipate in a daylong session during which all the proposals
were evaluated. The PRC, acutely aware of inconsistencies,
errors, and other problems in the evaluation of the pro-
posals they had received from the COAC, struggled
through the session to assign the 50 proposed projects into
the following three categories.
• Category A: Projects meeting Proposition O eligibility
requirements and receiving high scores in the evalua-
tion process
• Category B: Projects needing modifications in order to
satisfy Proposition O eligibility requirements
• Category C: Projects not meeting Proposition O
eligibility requirements
The PRC developed yet another category, B-2, for those
projects needing further investigation, additional quantifi-
cation information, and an additional concept report. It
turns out that only a few of the projects proposed by
nonprofits had the technical specificity needed to quantify
water quality benefits. Additionally, most of the projects
put forward by community nonprofit environmental orga-
nizations were multiple-benefits projects that included
local green space benefits or other such improvements. The
B-2 category was created because members of the COAC
and the PRC did not want to seem to be excluding pro-
posals generated by nonprofit environmental organizations.
The PRC selected 22 proposals, of which 59% were city
projects, 18% were from other municipalities and govern-
mental entities, and 23% were environmental nonprofit
projects.
The multiple-benefit projects proposed by nonprofits
encountered two problems.
1. The technical support provided by the consultant
engineering firms had been inadequate to help craft
well-developed proposals; there was not enough fund-
ing to do a complete job.
2. Because multiple benefits are difficult to quantify, the
‘‘soft’’ results promised by multiple-benefits proposals
inevitably fell short of the results indicated in more
traditionally formulated proposals.
Those environmental nonprofits whose projects were
categorized as B-2 received more time to develop their
proposals, but the technical calculations necessary to be
competitive with traditional storm-water projects were
beyond the expertise and fiscal capability of nearly all
nonprofit organizations.
Methods
Our methods for this case study were both qualitative and
quantitative. Qualitative methods included attending public
participation and education meetings, monthly Proposition
O meetings of the COAC and the AOC, and numerous
other Proposition O related meetings over nearly 2 years.
We reviewed Proposition O- and CWA-related technical
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reports and news reports as well, and surveyed the litera-
ture on storm-water remediation and multiple-benefits
approaches. The principal investigator also traveled to
Baltimore to study the Watershed 263 program and con-
ducted interviews with governmental, nonprofit, and
university researchers about the structure of the program,
funding, and roles and responsibilities.
Our quantitative method consisted of a survey. The
survey questions were organized around two areas of
inquiry:
1. The process of implementation
2. The criteria for selection of projects developed by the
Citizens Oversight Advisory Committee (COAC)
We sent 80 questionnaires to the following:
• Selected COAC members representing each category of
appointee
• All Project Review Committee members
• The three technical consultants who assisted applicants
in preparing proposals
• Community activists who were present at nearly all the
COAC meetings
• Community environmental nonprofit applicants





4. City and government employees
Questionnaires were distributed to each group by mail
and e-mail. The questions for each group were slightly
different. We also interviewed eight representative indi-
viduals involved in the process. These included members
from the COAC, from the governmental and nonprofit
project applicants, citizen watchdog attendees at the COAC
hearings and other related meetings, and members of the
environmental nonprofit organizations involved in writing
Proposition O. We asked each of them the same questions
as on the questionnaire but allowed for additional open-
ended comments to ensure that the questionnaire ade-
quately captured the concerns of the community of
individuals and organizations involved in Proposition O.
Responses were received by August 2006.
Results
Questionnaire and Interview Results and Issues
We distributed 80 questionnaires, of which 44 were
returned, a 55% return rate. While the total number of
returned surveys is not large, the respondents were highly
representative of the concerned population. Of the 50
project applicants, 62% responded to the questionnaire.
Two of the three engineering consultants responded. Sixty-
three percent of the PRC members responded, and 49% of
the environmental experts. Tables 1, 2 and 3 summarize
the results of the questionnaires.
Nonprofit Responses
The discomfiture expressed both in the questionnaire’s
comment box and in our one-on-one interviews with
Table 1 Nonprofit applicants’ survey responses
Good Fair Poor
Outreach workshops 88%
Project evaluation criteria 75% of criteria unclear
City technical assistance 90%
Interaction with PRC 80%
Process of project evaluation 98%
PRC Project Review Committee
Table 3 Watershed Protection Division-hired engineering consul-
tants’ survey responses
Score (n = 2)
Proposition O: a competitive grant program? 1: yes
1: no
City budget sufficient to provide adequate
technical assistance to NGOs?
2: no
Criteria utilized by PRC 2: they were
adequate
Ability to quantify multiple benefits in NGO
proposals
2: unable to do
so
Difficulty in assisting NGOs 2: average
Assessment of own expertise in storm water 2: high
PRC Project Review Committee
Table 2 Project Review Committee survey responses
Score (%)
Scoring and categories ambiguous and inconsistent 92
Definition of categories and multiple objectives confusing 75
Need for nonprofits to present proposals because
inadequate information provided and ambiguous
95
Need for site visits due to unfamiliarity with NGO-
proposed locations for projects
75
Insufficient staffing and time to adequately review NGO
proposals and assist NGOs
67
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nonprofit applicants indicates that they felt misled by the
process. The bond language explicitly included public
participation in proposing projects, and the city provided
funds to help groups develop projects, but project choice
using city criteria, and the implementation of chosen pro-
jects, remained solely under city control. This was
unexpected by the nonprofit applicants, who had expected a
chance to publicly and democratically participate in the
choice of projects. In addition, a number of the nonprofit
applicants believed that they would be eligible for bond
money to construct projects. This expectation was due to
factors beyond the Los Angeles region. An increasing
number of programs that are state funded rely on nonprofit
organizations to implement them through a competitive
process. Somehow, groups in Los Angeles interpreted the
structuring of Proposition O as being similarly organized,
even though the bond did not contain such language. The
solicitation process for projects and the assistance offered
for project preparation so closely resembled the other bond
initiatives that the local groups did not perceive the
difference.
The WPD—the city agency responsible for compliance
with the CWA and the development and implementation of
storm-water pollution abatement projects throughout the
city—was on Proposition O’s Project Review Committee
and also had the responsibility for managing and admin-
istering Proposition O. Additionally, it had its own projects
competing for the fund. This created an inevitable sense
that the department steered the decision making toward
projects that met its own internal goals. While the WPD
projects were justifiable under Proposition O’s purpose to
improve storm water, the WPD did not disclose its internal
logic of project selection in order for the public to feel it
could understand the internal WPD prioritization process
for Proposition O funding. In fact, early on in the process,
the WPD introduced the installation of additional catch-
basin inserts and covers in high-trash-generating areas to
meet trash TMDLs in the project list, with no review by the
PRC at all. As a result, a number of environmental non-
profit groups developed the impression that they had to
compete unfairly with an unwritten WPD agenda: to
finance WPD projects already on the drawing board but for
which there had been no funding. While this is difficult to
prove, the lack of transparency in the process led many to
conclude this outcome.
Engineering Consultants’ Response
The responses by the engineering consultants retained by
the city to assist the nonprofits in preparing their proposals,
as reported in Table 3, indicate that they felt the criteria
developed by the COAC to evaluate projects were inade-
quate, that the COAC did not have enough expertise to
adequately assess multiple-benefits proposals, and that
there was inadequate funding to help the nonprofits.
Environmental Experts’ Responses
Questions sent to environmental experts generally reflected
a concern that the multiple-benefit criteria developed by the
COAC were vague and poorly defined, and that all the
water quality improvement criteria should have been
combined in one encompassing criterion such as the
reduction of pollutant loads. They felt that addressing the
pollution problem by individual TMDL was a secondary
priority. Answers also reflected a technical orientation
toward storm-water remediation, with less value placed on
the multiple-benefit and public-participation aspects of the
process.
Proposition O Expenditures
To date, well over $462 million has been allocated for
those projects approved by the Los Angeles City Council,
and almost $13 million in projects recommended by the
COAC and AOC is pending City Council approval. The
nonprofits that had hoped to resubmit in subsequent rounds
of funding to improve their proposals were disappointed—
all the money was allocated in the first round, despite
COAC assurances that there would be subsequent rounds.
A number of the projects to repair aging infrastructure
and/or fund ongoing programs that, at the same time, had
some impact on storm-water and dry-weather runoff were
also approved by the COAC. One such program was to
replace an old and leaky extensive irrigation system in one
of the city parks, justified by the amount of dry-weather
runoff and concomitant pollution that would be eliminated.
There was a great deal of debate among the members of the
COAC about whether such repair projects fulfilled the
intent of Proposition O. Some COAC members felt that
Proposition O was city money and could be used for just
about any city infrastructure project, and others argued that
Proposition O funds should be used primarily for projects
that had direct water quality benefits. For a city where
raising taxes requires a two-thirds majority vote, and
delinquent in infrastructure maintenance, Proposition O
was an attractive source of funding, and in the end, being
able to make needed repairs prevailed.
Discussion: What Lessons for Public Funding Access
and Participation?
New programs and approaches in the policy world of
nonpoint source water pollution now often involve
multiple stakeholders representing different interests. The
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Chesapeake Bay and Watershed 263 programs of the City
of Baltimore, the CALFED Bay-Delta program of Cali-
fornia, and watershed and storm-water management in the
cities of Portland and Seattle, among others, have created
opportunities for greater public involvement through
watershed associations, taskforces, collaborative planning,
and research and programs. A number of these nonpoint
source projects employ multiple-benefit, integrated strate-
gies that include the use of biogenic agents (nature’s
services) to help treat storm water and to green urban
environments (Holden 1971; Nichols and others 1986;
Costanza and Greer 1995; Henessey 1997; Liptan and
Murase 2002; Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Richardson
2006).
For example, the Chesapeake Bay Baltimore Watershed
263 initiative included community members in developing
its watershed model (Korfmacher 2001), and combines
community greening, depaving, tree planting, storm-water
trash inserts, and water quality monitoring in a multiple-
benefit approach to storm-water remediation. Tree planting
and depaving activities are being undertaken by the city in
partnership with community-based nonprofit organizations
and the effects are being monitored by research scientists to
ascertain their actual impacts on water quality outflows
(Principal Investigator visit). Initiatives such as these, and
others like Great Outdoors Colorado, which fund land use
conservation, constitute a new approach to environmental
management, a kind of stakeholder democracy of public/
private partnerships with nonprofit organizations that
results in the coproduction of programs.
Great Outdoors Colorado was created by a statewide
vote designating a portion of lottery revenue for grants for
parks, wildlife, outdoor recreation, and open space. A 17-
member board, appointed by the governor and confirmed
by the state senate, governs the board; the grants are
competitive, an increasingly common approach, and they
require a match of some sort of the group that obtains them
(Steelman 2000). The board essentially takes state funds
and distributes them to nongovernmental organizations to
spend on initiatives approved by the board. The state
government is not directly involved in implementing pro-
jects. The Clean Water Management Trust Funds in North
Carolina and Florida have a similar approach.
Farmland preservation bonds and conservation ease-
ments are other examples of the growing set of tools for
the environment often developed by the nonprofit sector
using state funds or tax incentives, working in collabo-
ration with state agencies to achieve creative ends
(Sample 1994; Morrisette 2001; Merelender and others
2004). These programs may be created by entities other
than government but rely on at least partial government
funding (direct or indirect) to implement and to carry out
the programs.
Salamon’s (2002) edited volume offers an extensive
review of the evolution of public/private cooperation and
the rise of what has been termed ‘‘governance.’’ Gover-
nance, including the coproduction of programs through
collaborations and cooperation, has been the response to
perceived state failure and the sense that public participa-
tion improves environmental management (Fiorino 2006).
Not only has public participation been seen to improve
environmental management, but the direct involvement in
implementing programs by nongovernmental entities, as
our examples have shown, has also been instituted in many
programs and initiatives.
In addition, Rydin and Pennington (2000) further argue
that there are two major reasons for the expanded levels of
citizen participation that characterize environmental regu-
lations and programs over the past several decades. One is
founded in the democratic right to be involved in the public
policy process, and that such participation ensures that
decision makers will be better exposed to the values and
preferences of society as a whole. Thus policies that
involve a wider range of parties are assumed to operate
with a greater level of consent and, hence, are more
desirable. The other reason, according to Rydin and Pen-
nington, is that greater public participation will assist in
producing a better policy outcome (pp. 154–155).
Proposition O was negotiated by diverse Los Angeles
stakeholders responding to the fiscal constraints of a city
that requires a supermajority vote to pass bonds or to raise
taxes and the imperatives of the CWA. Finding itself out of
compliance with CWA TMDLs, and with insufficient
general funds to begin to tackle the task, city officials
enlisted environmental nonprofits in the writing of Propo-
sition O and to campaign for the measure’s passage.
The language of the proposition created a process in
which the public could participate and suggest projects, and
it included the goal of multiple-benefit projects. But as it
turned out, multiple benefits meant different things to dif-
ferent interests. For the city, the inclusion of multiple-
benefit projects translated into flexibility in the use of the
bond funds. For environmental nonprofits, multiple use
meant the application of solutions that were alternatives to
conventional end-of-the-pipe storm-water cleanup, solu-
tions based in the creation of more open spaces, the
transformation of hard surfaces into more permeable ones
to permit water infiltration, and tree planting for storm-
water interception and community benefit.
Governance, the coproduction of programs through
collaborations and cooperation, has been the outcome of
perceived state failure and the sense that public participa-
tion improves environmental management (Fiorino 2006).
But often overlooked in this view is that community par-
ticipation is costly in person-hours and can be unrewarding
because the necessary time commitments to participate are
520 Environmental Management (2009) 43:514–522
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often uncompensated (Lawrence and Deagen 2001; Irvin
and Stansbury 2004). In our case study we found that when
such participation is not rewarded either by funding to
implement a proposal or by the city itself choosing the
nonprofits’ proposal and implementing it, the result is a
sense of not genuinely being part of the process. Public
perception of the bond’s implementation, as evinced by the
responses to our questionnaires and interviews, was that
city government acted as a bureaucratic other, essentially
funding its own projects, and the public process was to-
kenistic. This interpretation, as we have seen, was created
by the ambiguity in the proposition’s language and exac-
erbated when city projects ‘‘won out’’ over nonprofit
proposals.
Lipsky (1980) points out that government workers are
themselves policy tools. Proposition O is an excellent
example of this: the WPD administered the process, framed
the information for the COAC and the AOC, presented and
recommended its own projects, and is administering the
building contracts. At the same time, using the WPD’s own
logic, it is carrying out its responsibility to comply with
federal laws, in this case the mandates of the CWA, and to
spend the public’s money (the bond) in a way that will
achieve knowable, documentable, and reliable results. Yet
in this period of skepticism about government, such due
diligence, without openness and transparency about the
strategy of implementation and inclusive decision making
to facilitate the practice of citizenship (Smith and Ingram
2002), leads to disappointed expectations. Government
workers are not seen as policy tools; rather they are seen as
self-interested implementers of policy.
Beyond Los Angeles
The obvious California-specific constraints regarding
sources of new funding directed at alleviating infrastruc-
ture-repair backlog were highly influential in defining the
perhaps purposefully ambiguous bond language, which
could then be interpreted as needed. While the situation in
Los Angeles is a result of decades of underfunding, many
cities across the country are—especially with the recent
economic downturn—facing fiscal problems in meeting
programmatic obligations. States are facing tight budgets,
as is the federal government. Process and public perception
will be ever more important.
Planning and implementation of infrastructure is a crit-
ical part of making cities work. It is expensive, and the way
in which it is built and maintained has enormous impacts
on the environment. Thus the judicious and thoughtful
involvement of the nonprofit sector in programmatic
approaches to infrastructure for the coproduction of envi-
ronmental management in a governance model provides an
avenue for much needed new infrastructure, but it needs to
be done well.
We propose three generalizable lessons from Proposi-
tion O:
1. The nonprofit sector often does not have the technical
capacity to engage in complex urban environmental
infrastructure projects. Thus coproduction may not
always be possible.
2. It is better for governmental agencies, if they wish to
retain control but enlist the support of critical
audiences, to be transparent about that desire.
3. The new model of dispersed multiple-benefit projects
is not yet well integrated into the old sanitary-city
approach, and thus there is an awkward tension
between paradigms.
In Los Angeles, Proposition O was a first step toward
solving infrastructure problems with a new approach that
included multiple benefits and a focus on community par-
ticipation in developing that new approach. In the end, it
promised more than it could deliver, but many lessons were
learned.
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